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Abstract—Aggregating statistically diverse renewable power
producers (RPPs) is an effective way to reduce the uncertainty
of the RPPs. The key question in aggregation of RPPs is how to
allocate payoffs among the RPPs. In this paper, a payoff allocation
mechanism (PAM) with a simple closed-form expression is
proposed: It achieves stability (in the core) and fairness both in
the “ex-post” sense, i.e., for all possible realizations of renewable
power generation. Furthermore, this PAM can in fact be derived
from the competitive equilibrium in a market. The proposed
PAM is evaluated in a simulation study with ten wind power
producers in the PJM interconnection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Renewable energies play a central role in achieving a
sustainable energy future. However, renewable energies such
as wind and solar power are inherently uncertain and variable,
and integrating them into the power system raises significant
reliability and efficiency challenges [1], [2]. A variety of ap-
proaches have been proposed to compensate for the uncertainty
of renewable energies, such as employing better generation
dispatch methods [3], fast-ramping generators, energy storage
control [4], [5], [6], and demand response programs [7].
Another solution that has received considerable attention is
to aggregate statistically diverse renewable energy sources [1],
[8], [9]. In an aggregation, renewable power producers (RPPs)
pool their generation together so as to reduce the aggregate
uncertainty and risk. As a result, by forming an aggregation,
the RPPs can earn a higher payoff in total, e.g., in electricity
markets. The central question in aggregating RPPs is then
how to distribute the total payoff of an aggregation among
its member RPPs. In particular, in designing payoff allocation
mechanisms (PAMs), it is desired to ensure the stability of the
aggregation (i.e., no subset of members are willing to leave),
and the fairness of the payoffs. In general, achieving such
properties can be studied in either the so-called “ex-ante” or
the “ex-post” sense: In the ex-ante sense, stability and fairness
properties are achieved “in expectation”; In the ex-post sense,
however, these properties must be achieved for all possible
realizations of renewable power generation.
In this paper, we focus on achieving ex-post stability and
fairness. In particular, we show that a simple payoff allocation
mechanism with a closed-form expression is “in the core” of
the game in the ex-post sense, and thus guarantees the stability
of the aggregation. We also show that this PAM achieves
fairness properties in the ex-post sense as well. Furthermore,
we show that the proposed PAM can in fact be derived from
the competitive equilibrium in a market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, related works on PAM design for achieving desirable
properties in the ex-post sense are summarized. In Section
III, the structure of the two-settlement electricity market is
described, and the desired properties of a PAM are defined.
In Section IV, we introduce a PAM that is proved to be in
the core of the coalitional game. We also prove that this PAM
achieves budget balance, individual rationality, fairness, and
no-exploitation properties. In Section V, the proposed PAM
is derived by computing the competitive equilibrium of a
market with transferrable payoff. A case study using the data
of ten wind power producers in PJM is given in Section VI.
Conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK ON PAYOFF ALLOCATION TO ACHIEVE
EX-POST PROPERTIES
A PAM that achieves “ex-post” individual rationality, bud-
get balance and fairness is proposed in [10]. It is also proved
that the resultant contract game of the model employed therein
has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. A proportional cost
sharing mechanism is proposed in [11]. By neglecting the
excess supply of the aggregator, the existence of at least
one pure Nash equilibrium in the resultant contract game is
investigated, and the properties of the mechanism are analyzed.
An extension of the PAM in [10] is proposed in [12], where
statistical information of the RPPs is used to find the optimal
forward power contract of the aggregator (similar to prior
studies in the “ex-ante” settings [13]). The PAM of [10] is
used as the base case, and the difference between the total
payoff of the aggregation when it uses the optimal forward
contract vs. when it uses the sum of RPPs’ power contracts
is distributed among the RPPs. The proposed PAM achieves
budget balance, fairness and ex-ante individual rationality.
A proportional cost sharing mechanism that achieves budget
balance, no-exploitation and fairness is proposed in [14]. Also,
assuming that the real-time selling price pr,s (cf. (1) in Section
III-A) is non-positive, it achieves ex-post individual rationality
as well. It is then proved that the contract game among the
RPPs, under certain assumption, has at least one pure Nash
equilibrium.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Renewable Power Producers in a Two Settlement Market
We consider RPPs participating in a two-settlement power
market consisting of a day-ahead (DA) and a real time (RT)
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market.
As a baseline case, we consider an RPP i who participates in
the market separately from the other RPPs. In the DA market,
RPP i’s generation at the time of interest in the next day is
modeled as a random variable, denoted by Xi. RPP i then sells
a forward power supply contract in the amount of ci in the
DA-market. It gets a payoff of pfci where pf denotes the price
in the DA market. At the delivery time in the next day, RPP i
obtains its realized generation xi: a) If it faces a shortfall, i.e.,
ci ´ xi ą 0, it needs to purchase the remaining power from
the RT market at a real-time buying price pr,b, b) if it has
excess power, i.e. xi ´ ci ą 0, it can sell it in the RT-market
at a real-time selling price pr,s. In case excess power needs to
be penalized as opposed to rewarded, we model such cases by
having pr,s ă 0. In this paper, the only assumption on prices
that we make is pr,s ď pr,b, which must hold for no arbitrage.
As a result, the realized payoff of an RPP i who separately
participates in the market is given by
Psepi “ pfci ´ pr,b pci ´ xiq` ` pr,s pxi ´ ciq` , (1)
where p¨q` “ maxp0, ¨q.
We note that, the DA market price pf can depend on the
DA contracts tciu, and the real time prices pr,b and pr,s can
depend on the realized power generation txiu (see, e.g., [9]).
Other factors of uncertainty may also contribute to the price
determination in the DA and RT markets. These complicate
the choices of ci by an RPP, although with simplifying
assumptions (e.g. price taking and known distribution of xi)
an optimal choice of ci can be computed (see [13] among
others).
Nonetheless, the above complicating factors on price and
contract determination do not affect our analysis for renewable
energy aggregation in the “ex-post” sense, as will be shown
next.
B. Aggregation of RPPs and Payoff Allocation
Aggregation of RPPs reduces the risk of their uncertain
future generation by exploiting the statistical diversity among
the RPPs. We consider an aggregator that aggregates the power
generation from a set of N RPPs, denoted by N , participates in
the DA-RT market on behalf of them, and allocates its payoff
back among the RPPs. In particular, we employ the following
model (cf. [10], [11], [12]) for aggregating RPPs:
a. Each RPP i submits a DA commitment ci pě 0q to the
aggregator.
b. In the DA market, the aggregator sells a forward power
contract in the amount of cN “ řiPN ci. At the delivery
time, the aggregator collects all the realized generation
from the RPPs, denoted by xN “ řiPN xi, to meet
the commitment cN . The deviation is settled in the RT
market in the same way as in Section III-A. The realized
payoff of the aggregator is thus given by
PA “ pfcN ´ pr,b pcN ´ xN q` ` pr,s pxN ´ cN q` .
(2)
c. The aggregator returns a payoff of Pi to each RPP i.
The key design question for the aggregator lies in the step
c. above, i.e., how to determine the payoffs Pi. In particular,
in designing the payoff allocation mechanism (PAM), several
desirable properties that an aggregator would like to achieve
are the following:
1) Ex-post budget balance:
ř
iPN Pi “ PA.
2) Ex-post individual rationality: Pi ě Psepi ,@i P N .
3) Fairness: For any two RPPi and RPPj , if ci ´ xi “
cj ´ xj , then Pi ´ pfci “ Pj ´ pfcj .
4) No-exploitation: If ci ´ xi “ 0, then Pi “ pfci.
5) Ex-post in the core: Being in the core in an “ex-
post” sense means that the RPPs’ payoffs satisfy the
following condition: if any subset of the RPPs leave the
aggregation, separately form their own aggregation, and
then participate in the market, they will get a payoff no
higher than the sum of their payoffs originally from the
aggregator. As a result, being in the core implies that
the grand coalition/aggregation is stable.
We note that achieving these properties in the ex-post sense
means that they must hold for all possible realizations of
renewable power generation.
Next, we make precise the definition of property 5), i.e.,
being in the core in the ex-post sense.
A Coalitional Game and Its Core: Similar to the realized
payoffs (1) and (2), we define a function vp¨q for the value of
a coalition of a subset of RPPs T Ď N as follows:
v pT q “ pfcT ´ pr,b pcT ´ xT q` ` pr,s pxT ´ cT q` (3)
where cT “ řiPT ci and xT “ řiPT xi. With the above
function vp¨q, and a PAM tPi, i P N u, we have a well-defined
coalitional game [15]. Now, in a coalitional game, a PAM tPiu
is said to be in the core if and only if it satisfies the following
set of inequalities:
@T Ď N , v pT q ď
ÿ
iPT
Pi. (4)
Note that the intuition of (4) is exactly as described above in
property 5). If (4) is satisfied for all possible realizations of
the random renewable generation, the PAM tPiu is said to be
in the core in the ex-post sense.
In Section IV, we will introduce a PAM that achieves all
the five properties above. Before we proceed to describing the
proposed PAM, we close this section by providing a reasoning
of the modeling assumption b. described above, namely, the
aggregator sells a forward power contract in the amount of
cN “ řiPN ci.
C. The Necessity of cN “ řiPN ci
Here we show that cN “ řiPN ci is a necessary condition
for achieving property 2), i.e., ex-post individual rationality. It
is thus also necessary for achieving property 5). We note that
this is regardless of the choices of DA commitments tciu that
the RPPs submit to the aggregator.
Lemma 1: @ tciu, to achieve ex-post individual rationality
and budget balance, we must have that cN “ řiPN ci.
Proof: Note that ex-post individual rationality implies
that Pi ě Psepi ,@i P N must hold for all possible realiza-
tions of renewable power generation. We now prove that, if
cN ą řiPN ci, there exists a realization scenario in which it is
impossible to achieve individual rationality. Such impossibility
for the case of cN ă řiPN ci can be proven similarly.
Suppose cN ą řiPN ci. Consider the scenario that a) every
RPPs has a shortfall, i.e., @i P N , xi ă ci, and b) pf ă pr,b.
Consequently,
PA “ pfcN ´ pr,b
˜
cN ´
ÿ
iPN
xi
¸
,ÿ
iPN
Psepi “
ÿ
iPN
`
pfci ´ pr,b pci ´ xiq
˘
“ pf
ÿ
iPN
ci ´ pr,b
˜ÿ
iPN
ci ´
ÿ
iPN
xi
¸
,
ñ PA ´
ÿ
iPN
Psepi “
`
pf ´ pr,b˘˜cN ´ ÿ
iPN
ci
¸
ă 0,
given that pf ă pr,b. With budget balance, PA “ řiPN Pi.
Thus,
ř
iPN pPi ´ Psepi q ă 0, and it is impossible to achieve
individual rationality (cf. property 2) in Section III-B) in this
scenario.
Now, with cN “ řiPN ci, a desirable implication is that
there is always a non-negative excess profit from aggregating
the RPPs compared to having them participate in the market
separately.
Corollary 1: @ tciu, with cN “ řiPN ci, we have that
PA ě řiPN Psepi for all possible realizations of renewable
power generation.
IV. PAYOFF ALLOCATION MECHANISM IN THE CORE
In this section, we introduce a payoff allocation mechanism
that achieves all the five desired properties defined in Section
III-B.
We first define the following notations for the (realization
dependent) sets of RPPs with generation surpluses and short-
falls, respectively.
S` :“ ti P N | xi ´ ci ě 0u , S´ :“ ti P N | xi ´ ci ă 0u
cS`“
ÿ
iPS`
ci, xS`“
ÿ
iPS`
xi, cS´“
ÿ
iPS´
ci, xS´“
ÿ
iPS´
xi.
(5)
We then have the following lemma on expressing the excess
profit in terms of the above notations:
Lemma 2: The excess profit from aggregating the RPPs
PA ´
ÿ
iPN
Psepi
“ `pr,b ´ pr,s˘min ppxS` ´ cS`q , pcS´ ´ xS´qq (6)
Proof: First, we have that
Psepi “
#
pfci ` pr,s pxi ´ ciq if i P S`
pfci ´ pr,b pci ´ xiq if i P S´
As a result,ÿ
iPN
Psepi “
ÿ
iPS`
Psepi `
ÿ
iPS´
Psepi
“ pf pcS` ` cS´q ´ pr,b pcS´ ´ xS´q ` pr,s pxS` ´ cS`q
(7)
We now consider the case of xS` ´ cS` ě cS´ ´ xS´ , i.e.,
there is an excess power in total in the aggregation. In this
case,
PA “ pf pcS` ` cS´q ` pr,s pxS` ` xS´ ´ cS` ´ cS´q (8)
From (7) and (8), we have:
PA ´
ÿ
iPN
Psepi “ ppr,b ´ pr,sq pcS´ ´ xS´q
“ `pr,b ´ pr,s˘min ppxS` ´ cS`q , pcS´ ´ xS´qq (9)
The case when xS` ´ cS` ă cS´ ´ xS´ can be proved
similarly.
A. The Proposed Payoff Allocation Mechanism
We now introduce the main result of this paper, namely, the
following payoff allocation mechanism:
Pi “
$’&’%
pfci ` pr,b pxi ´ ciq if xN ´ cN ă 0
pfci ` p˚ pxi ´ ciq if xN ´ cN “ 0
pfci ` pr,s pxi ´ ciq if xN ´ cN ą 0
, (10)
where pr,s ď p˚ ď pr,b, and p˚ can be chosen arbitrarily
within this range.
To understand the intuition of this PAM, it is instructive to
consider the following two cases, respectively:
‚ Case 1: The grand coalition has a shortfall in total, i.e.
xN ´ cN ă 0. In this case, according to (10), Pi “
Psepi ,@i P S´, i.e., those RPPs with a shortfall earns
exactly the same as if they each participates in the market
separately. In comparison, @i P S`, Pi´Psepi “ ppr,b´
pr,sqpxi ´ ciq. As a result, only those RPPs in S` can
gain extra earnings compared to if they participate in the
markets separately. In other words, all the excess profit
(6) are allocated to those RPPs with a surplus.
‚ Case 2: The grand coalition has a surplus in total, i.e.
xN ´ cN ą 0. In this case, Pi “ Psepi ,@i P S`, i.e.,
those RPPs with a surplus earn exactly the same as if
they participate in the market separately. In comparison,
@i P S´, Pi´Psepi “ ppr,b´ pr,sqpci´xiq. As a result,
all the excess profit (6) are allocated to those RPPs with
a shortfall.
‚ Case 3: The grand coalition exactly meets its total
commitment, i.e. xN “ cN . In this case, there is a family
of payoff allocations that are all in the core: any p˚ such
that pr,s ď p˚ ď pr,b works. Consequently, the PAM that
is in the core is not unique in this sense.
B. The Proposed PAM is in the Core
We now state the main theorem of the paper:
Theorem 1: The proposed PAM (10) satisfies the five prop-
erties 1) - 5) (cf. Section III-B) in the ex-post sense.
Proof: Budget balance, fairness and no exploitation can
be verified straightforwardly. Next, we prove that the PAM
is in the core in the ex-post sense (4), which then implies
individual rationality.
Consider T as an arbitrary subset of N , and define T ` :“
ti P T | xi ´ ci ě 0u and T ´ :“ ti P T | xi ´ ci ă 0u. We
now consider the three scenarios of the grand coalition having
a shortfall in total, or a surplus, or neither, respectively.
‚ Case 1: The grand coalition has a shortfall in total, i.e.
xN ´ cN ă 0.
We have that,ÿ
iPT
Pi p10q“
ÿ
iPT
pfci
` pr,b
˜˜ ÿ
iPT `
pxi ´ ciq
¸
´
˜ ÿ
iPT ´
pci ´ xiq
¸¸
.
(11)
In comparison, if the subset T leaves the grand ag-
gregation and participates in the market as a “smaller”
aggregation, its payoff would be the following:
v pT q “
ÿ
iPT
pfci
`
$’’’&’’’%
´pr,b ppřiPT ´ pci ´ xiqq ´ přiPT ` pxi ´ ciqqq
if xT ´ cT ă 0
`pr,s ppřiPT ` pxi ´ ciqq ´ přiPT ´ pci ´ xiqqq
if xT ´ cT ě 0.
(12)
From (11) and (12), with pr,b ě pr,s, we have thatř
iPT Pi ě v pT q.
‚ Case 2: The grand coalition has a surplus in total, i.e.
xN ´ cN ą 0.
We have that,ÿ
iPT
Pi p10q“
ÿ
iPT
pfci
` pr,s
˜˜ ÿ
iPT `
pxi ´ ciq
¸
´
˜ ÿ
iPT ´
pci ´ xiq
¸¸
(13)
From (12) and (13), with pr,b ě pr,s, we have thatř
iPT Pi ě v pT q.
‚ Case 3: The grand coalition exactly meets its total
commitment, i.e. xN “ cN . We have that,ÿ
iPT
Pi p10q“
ÿ
iPT
pfci
` p˚
˜˜ ÿ
iPT `
pxi ´ ciq
¸
´
˜ ÿ
iPT ´
pci ´ xiq
¸¸
(14)
From (12) and (14), with pr,s ď p˚ ď pr,b, we have thatř
iPT Pi ě v pT q.
V. DERIVING THE PAYOFF ALLOCATION MECHANISM
FROM A COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we show that the proposed PAM (10) can in
fact be derived from computing the competitive equilibrium of
a specially defined market. This is indeed how we discovered
this PAM. The idea based on competitive equilibrium shares
similar insight with that in a prior work [9] which derives a
closed-form PAM in the core in the “ex-ante” sense.
A. Market with Transferrable Payoff
We first define the following market with transferrable
payoff [15]:
‚ The RPPs, denoted by N , are a finite set of N agents.
‚ There is one type of input goods — power generation.
‚ Each agent i P N has an “endowment” in the amount of
xi P R` — the realized power of RPP i.
‚ Each agent i P N has a continuous, nondecreasing, and
concave “production” function fi : R` Ñ R:
fipxiq “ Psepi “ pfci ´ pr,b pci ´ xiq` ` pr,s pxi ´ ciq` .
(15)
Since all the “production” functions tfiu produce the same
type of transferrable output, i.e., monetary payoff, the above
formulation precisely defines a market with transferrable pay-
off.
Next, a coalitional game can be defined based on a market
with transferrable payoff [15]. Specifically, for any coalition
of a subset of RPPs T Ď N , define
v pT q “ max
tziPR`,iPT u
ÿ
iPT
fipziq (16)
s.t.
ÿ
iPT
zi “
ÿ
iPT
xi.
In other words, tzi, i P T u denotes a redistribution of the
total realized power
ř
iPT xi among the members of T . This
vpT q represents the maximum total payoff that the members
of T can achieve among all possible redistributions, computed
according to fi defined in (15). The core of this coalitional
game is also called the “core of the market”.
We now prove that this coalitional game is exactly the same
as the coalitional game defined previously in (3).
Lemma 3: The values of coalitions (16) are the same as (3).
Proof: Straightforwardly, (3) ě (16) because (3) is
the maximum achievable payoff by the subset T after their
aggregation. Next, we show that (3) can be achieved by (16),
i.e., (3) ď (16).
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, we define T ` :“
ti P T | xi ´ ci ě 0u and T ´ :“ ti P T | xi ´ ci ă 0u. The
intuition of a redistribution tziu to achieve (3) is the following:
We give as much of the excess power of the RPPs in T ` as
possible to the RPPs in T ´ to offset their deficit power.
Specifically, if xT ´ cT ă 0, i.e., řiPT ´ pci ´ xiq ąř
iPT ` pxi ´ ciq, we let
@i P T `, zi “ ci, (17)
@i P T ´, xi ď zi ď ci,
so that
ÿ
iPT ´
pzi ´ xiq “
ÿ
iPT `
pxi ´ ziq . (18)
As a result,ÿ
iPT
fipziq “
ÿ
iPT `
fipziq `
ÿ
iPT ´
fipziq
“
ÿ
iPT `
pfci `
ÿ
iPT ´
`
pfci ´ pr,bpci ´ ziq
˘
“ pfcT ´ pr,b
ÿ
iPT ´
ppci ´ xiq ´ pzi ´ xiqq
“ pfcT ´ pr,b
˜ ÿ
iPT ´
pci ´ xiq ´
ÿ
iPT `
pxi ´ ciq
¸
(19)
“ pfcT ´ pr,bpcT ´ xT q “ (3), (20)
where (19) is implied by (17) and (18).
The case of xT ´ cT ě 0 can be proved similarly.
As a result, from the property of market with transferrable
payoff (cf. Proposition 264.2 in [15]), we immediately have
that this coaltional game has a non-empty core.
Moreover, this formulation as a market enables us to
compute a solution in the core by deriving the competitive
equilibrium (CE) of the market, as follows.
B. Competitive Equilibrium
For the market with transferrable payoff defined in the last
subsection, a competitive equilibrium is defined [15] as a
price-quantity pair of p˚ P R` and z˚ P RN` , such that,
i) For each agent i, zi˚ solves the following problem:
max
ziPR`
pfi pziq ´ p˚ pzi ´ xiqq. (21)
ii) z˚ is a redistribution, i.e.,
ř
iPN zi˚ “
ř
iPN xi.
The intuition of a CE is the following: At the price p˚, i) to
maximize its payoff, each agent i can trade any amount of the
input (realized power) on the market without worrying whether
there is enough supply or demand to fulfill its trade request,
and ii) collectively, the market of input supply and demand
still clears, i.e., the resulting z˚ from the optimal trades is
feasible.
At a competitive equilibrium pp˚, z˚q, p˚ is called the
competitive price, and the value of the maximum of (21) is
called the competitive payoff of agent i.
We then have the following theorem (cf. Proposition 267.1
in [15]) dictating that all the CEs are in the core.
Theorem 2: Every profile of competitive payoffs in a mar-
ket with transferable payoff is in the core of the market.
Accordingly, to find a solution in the core of the market,
which is also the core of the coalitional game for aggregating
RPPs (cf. Lemma 3), it is sufficient to find a CE in the market
with transferrable payoff defined in the last section.
Deriving the Competitive Equilibrium:
For the market with transferrable payoff defined in the last
subsection, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3: Competitive equilibrium exists, and the com-
petitive payoffs necessarily take the form of the proposed PAM
(10).
Proof: With the production function fipxiq defined to be
Psepi as in (15), we observe that fipxiq is a piecewise linear
function: f 1ipxiq “
#
pr,b, if xi ă ci
pr,s, if xi ą ci .
As a result, at a CE, we must have pr,b ď p˚ ď pr,s.
Otherwise, by solving (21), either all RPPs would sell all of
their power, or all of them would buy an infinite amount of
power; Neither case would clear the market with
ř
iPN zi˚ “ř
iPN xi.
We now analyze the optimal behavior of any agent i under
the following three scenarios of the competitive price p˚:
‚ If p˚ “ pr,b, the maximum of (21) is achieved if and
only if zi ď ci.
‚ If p˚ “ pr,s, the maximum of (21) is achieved if and
only if zi ě ci.
‚ If pr,s ă p˚ ă pr,b, the maximum of (21) is achieved if
and only if zi “ ci.
To derive the competitive price p˚ that clears the market
with
ř
iPN zi˚ “
ř
iPN xi, we consider the following three
scenarios:
Case i) xN ´ cN ă 0: As result, at the CE, řiPN zi˚ ăř
iPN ci˚ . From the above, we necessarily have p˚ “ pr,b.
Indeed, with p˚ “ pr,b, there exists z˚ such that a) zi˚ ď ci,
and b)
ř
iPN zi˚ “
ř
iPN xi ă cN .
Moreover, it is immediate to check that the competitive
payoff of RPP i equals pfci ` pr,b pxi ´ ciq (cf. (10)).
Case ii) xN ´ cN ą 0: As result, at the CE, řiPN zi˚ ąř
iPN ci˚ . From the above, we necessarily have p˚ “ pr,s.
Indeed, with p˚ “ pr,s, there exists z˚ such that a) zi˚ ě ci,
and b)
ř
iPN zi˚ “
ř
iPN xi ą cN .
Moreover, the competitive payoff of RPP i equals pfci `
pr,s pxi ´ ciq (cf. (10)).
Case iii) xN ´ cN “ 0: In this case, @p˚, s.t. pr,s ď p˚ ď
pr,b, zi˚ “ ci,@i achieves
ř
iPN zi˚ “
ř
iPN xi “ cN .
Moreover, the competitive payoff of RPP i equals pfci `
p˚ pxi ´ ciq (cf. (10)).
From Theorem 2 and 3, we conclude that the competitive
payoffs that equal (10) are always in the core of the market,
and hence the core of the coalitional game (3). This thus offers
an alternative proof for Theorem 1.
VI. SIMULATION
A. Data Description and Simulation Setup
We perform simulations using the NREL dataset [16] based
on ten wind power producers located in PJM. The simulation
is run with the data of these ten wind power producers (WPPs)
for the month of Feb. 2004. In each hour of the simulation,
each WPP i submits a day ahead forward power contract
ci: In particular, we assume that each WPP i submits its
optimal contract as if it separately participates in the market.
This optimal hourly day-ahead forward power contract can
be solved as the solution to a news-vendor problem [13].
To solve for this optimal individual contract, the statistical
distribution of each WPP’s future generation is needed. We
consider that each WPP uses normal distributions to model its
future generation: For each hour of the next day, a) an WPP’s
forecast for that future hour, available from the NREL dataset
[16], is taken as the the mean of such a distribution, and b) the
variance is approximated using the data of that WPP during
Jan. 2004.
B. Simulation and Results
For each hour, the aggregator a) commits in the DA market
a forward power contract equal to the sum of the WPPs’
forward power contracts, and b) collects the sum of the WPPs’
realized generation. The payoff of the aggregator is computed
according to (2) based on this sum of realization and its
previously committed DA contract for this hour. The proposed
PAM (10) is then employed to allocate the payoff to all the
WPPs.
For comparison, we evaluate the payoff that each WPP
would get had it separately participate in the market (1).
Furthermore, we compare the WPPs’ payoffs with the payoff
allocation mechanism developed in our prior work for the “ex-
ante” setting [17]. The numerical results are summarized in
Fig. 1. The sum of the payoffs of the ten WPPs for the three
evaluations are compared in Table I. Finally, the traces of the
hourly payoff over time for WPP 5 with the proposed PAM,
the ex-ante PAM, and separate participation in the market are
plotted in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of daily average payoffs of the WPPs.
We make the following observations:
‚ As expected, the proposed PAM achieves individual ratio-
nality in the ex-post sense. In contrast, the “ex-ante” PAM
[17] achieves individual rationality only in expectation,
and does not guarantee ex-post individual rationality. This
can be observed around hour 145 in Fig. 2.
Moreover, the proposed PAM, as proved, is also in the
core in the ex-post sense.
‚ As shown in Table I, the total payoff of the WPPs
with the proposed PAM is slightly p0.72%q lower than
that with the “ex-ante” PAM [17]. The reason is the
following. In the “ex-ante” PAM, the aggregator commits
the optimal power contract by solving the news-vendor
problem for the grand coalition. In contrast, in the model
employed in this paper (cf. modeling assumptions a.-
c. in Section III-B), the aggregator simply commits the
sum of the WPPs’ power contracts, which we assume
are derived by solving the optimal forward contracts by
each WPP individually (and hence are not optimal from
an aggregation’s point of view).
TABLE. I. SUM OF THE PAYOFFS OF THE TEN WPPS
“Ex-ante” The proposed Separate
PAM [17] in-the-core PAM
Total
payoff of 1.0428ˆ 107 1.0353ˆ 107 9.1480ˆ 106
the RPPs
‚ As shown in Fig. 2, the payoff traces of the proposed
PAM and the “ex-ante” PAM follow each other very
closely most of the times. However, the “ex-ante” PAM
appears to be “riskier”. The payoff with the “ex-ante”
PAM sometimes has high peaks, higher than the corre-
sponding payoff with the proposed PAM. An example
is around hour 80. Meanwhile, the payoff with the “ex-
ante” PAM sometimes also has low valleys, lower than
the corresponding payoff with the proposed PAM. An
example is around hour 580. This phenomenon of “ex-
ante” PAM being riskier than the proposed is consistent
with the fact that the “ex-ante” PAM is only individually
rational in expectation, whereas the proposed PAM is in
the core for all possible realizations of the renewable
generation.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of payoffs of WPP 5 for the proposed PAM, the
“ex-ante” PAM [17], and separate market participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied the problem of payoff allocation for
aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs). We have first
shown that the forward power contract of the aggregator must
be equal to the sum of the member RPPs’ power contracts in
order to achieve ex-post individual rationality. We have then
proposed a payoff allocation mechanism that is in the core in
the ex-post sense, and hence ensures the stability of the RPP
aggregation. The proposed payoff allocation mechanism also
achieves budget balance, individual rationality, fairness and
no-exploitation, all in the ex-post sense. Moreover, we show
that the proposed PAM can be derived from a competitive
equilibrium in a market with transferrable payoff.
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